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Abstract—In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) provides
information-theoretic security based on the laws of physics.
Owing to the imperfections of real-life implementations, however,
there is a big gap between the theory and practice of QKD,
which has been recently exploited by several quantum hacking
activities. To fill this gap, a novel approach, called measurement-
device-independent QKD (mdiQKD), has been proposed. It can
remove all side-channels from the measurement unit, arguably
the most vulnerable part in QKD systems, thus offering a clear
avenue towards secure QKD realisations. Here, we review the
latest developments in the framework of mdiQKD, together with
its assumptions, strengths and weaknesses.
Index Terms—Quantum key distribution (QKD), quan-
tum cryptography, quantum hacking, measurement-device-
independent QKD, quantum communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication is essential in today’s digital society,
with billions of users accessing the Internet via different
terminals and mobile devices. The goal is to transmit a secret
message from a sender (Alice) to a receiver (Bob) such that
an eavesdropper (Eve) cannot access the message. It is well
known that this problem can be solved using the one-time-
pad protocol [1]. This protocol requires, however, that Alice
and Bob share a secret key. With this key, Alice can encrypt
the message (so-called plaintext) into a ciphertext that is
unintelligible to Eve. On receiving the ciphertext, Bob can
recover the plaintext by using his key. Importantly, the security
of the one-time-pad protocol relies only on the secrecy of the
shared key. This renders the problem of secure communication
essentially equivalent to that of distributing a key securely.
This is the task of quantum key distribution (QKD) [2].
Unlike the widely-used public-key cryptography [3], which
bases its security on unproven computational assumptions,
QKD can provide information-theoretically secure key dis-
tribution based solely on the laws of physics. Indeed, if a
quantum computer is ever built, many classical public-key
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schemes will become insecure [4]. In sharp contrast, QKD
will always remain secure despite the computational and
technological power of Eve. That is, when combined with the
one-time-pad protocol, QKD can be used to achieve perfectly
secure communication.
A. Quantum key distribution (QKD)
The best-known QKD protocol is the so-called BB84
scheme introduced by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [2]. Its
security is based on the quantum no-cloning theorem, which
states that it is impossible (for Eve) to make perfect copies of
an unknown quantum state. Therefore, the higher the amount
of information that Eve learns about a quantum signal, the
higher the amount of disturbance that she causes on it. By
sacrificing a randomly chosen portion of their data, Alice
and Bob can estimate this disturbance (by calculating, for
instance, the quantum bit error rate (QBER)) and thus bound
Eve’s information about the distributed key. This compromised
information can then be removed from the final key by using
privacy amplification methods. The unconditional security of
QKD has been rigorously proven in several papers [5], [6],
[7], [8], [9].
B. Quantum hacking
While in theory QKD is unconditionally secure, in practice,
however, there is an important gap between the assumptions
made in the security proofs of QKD and the actual implemen-
tations. This is so because real devices suffer from inevitable
imperfections that can cause them to operate quite differently
from the mathematical models used to prove security. As
a result, Eve could exploit such imperfections to learn the
distributed key without being detected.
The first successful quantum hacking attack against a com-
mercial QKD system was the time-shift attack [10]. It is
based on an earlier theoretical proposal introduced in [11] (see
Fig. 1a). Standard single-photon detectors (SPDs) such as, for
example, InGaAs avalanche photodiodes, are often operated in
a gated mode [12]. This means that their detection efficiency
is time-dependent [13]. Importantly, since every QKD system
contains at least two detectors to measure two different bit
values, it is usually quite difficult to guarantee that both
detectors have precisely the same detection efficiency all the
time. In this scenario, Eve can simply shift the arrival time of
each signal such that one detector has a much higher detection
efficiency than the other [11]. As a result, she could obtain
partial information about the final key without introducing
almost any error.
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Fig. 1. (Color online) (a) Schematic illustration of the typical detection
efficiency mismatch between two single-photon detectors (SPD0 and SPD1
in the figure). This could be used by Eve to perform a time-shift attack [10].
In this attack, Eve shifts the arrival time of each signal sent by Alice to either
t1 or t2 such that one detector has a much higher detection efficiency than the
other. In so doing, she can obtain information about the final key without being
detected. (b) Schematic illustration of the detector blinding attack [14]. First,
Eve sends Bob bright light (not shown in the figure) to blind his detectors
and make them enter into linear mode operation. After that, she sends Bob a
tailored light pulse that produces a “click” in one of his detector only when
he uses the same measurement basis employed by Eve to prepare her signal.
Otherwise, no detector “clicks”. As a result, Eve can determine which detector
generates a “click” at each given time and thus learn the whole key without
introducing any noticeable disturbance. (Figure 1b adapted with permission
from [14]).
Recently, a more powerful attack—the so-called detector
blinding attack—was introduced in [14]. It allows Eve to
learn the whole key without being detected. The procedure
is as follows (see Fig. 1b). Eve sends bright light to Bob’s
detectors to force them enter into the so-called linear mode
operation [14]. In so doing, the SPDs are no longer sensitive
to single-photon pulses but they behave like classical intensity
photo-detectors. As a consequence, Eve can now fully control
which detector “clicks” just by sending Bob a tailored light
pulse. This attack has been successfully implemented against
both commercial [14], [15], [16] and research [17] QKD
setups.
Quantum hacking has attracted a lot of research interest
in recent years, and several attacks have been demonstrated
experimentally [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25],
[26]. Most of them exploit loopholes in Bob’s measurement
system [18], [20], [21], [22], [24], [25], [26], which can be
considered as the Achilles heel of QKD implementations.
This is so because Eve can send Bob any signal she wishes,
which makes the protection of Bob’s device quite difficult. In
contrast, Alice can in principle protect her source by using, for
instance, optical isolators. It is therefore reasonable to expect
that she can determine the quantum states that she prepares
and then include this information in the security analysis [27],
[28]. Note that a recent experiment has shown that the state
preparation flaws do not significantly affect the performance
of decoy-state BB84 [28].
C. Countermeasures against quantum hacking
Currently there are at least four main possible approaches to
avoid the problem of quantum hacking and recover the security
TABLE I
ASSUMPTIONS IN DIQKD VERSUS MDIQKD
diQKD mdiQKD
True random number generators Yes Yes
Trusted classical post-processing Yes Yes
Authenticated classical channel Yes Yes
No unwanted information leakage from the
measurement unit Yes No
Characterised source No Yes
of QKD implementations.
The first solution consists in obtaining “precise mathe-
matical models” for all the devices and then include this
information into the security proof [29], [30]. However, as
QKD components are complex apparatuses, this approach is
unfortunately very challenging to realise in practice.
The second one is what we call “patches”. Fortunately, once
a particular attack is known, it is typically relatively easy to
find an appropriate countermeasure against it [31], [32]. The
main drawbacks of this solution are, however, unanticipated
attacks. This is so because this approach only protects against
known hacking strategies. Therefore, its security resembles
that of classical cryptography.
The third solution is called device-independent QKD
(diQKD) [33], [34], [35]. Here, Alice and Bob do not need to
know how their devices operate, but they can treat them as two
“black boxes”. It requires, however, that certain assumptions
are satisfied (see Table I). For instance, Alice and Bob need
to guarantee that there is no leakage of unwanted information
from their measurement apparatuses. In this scenario, it is
possible to prove the security of diQKD based solely on the
violation of a Bell inequality, which certifies the existence of
quantum correlations. Remarkably, this approach can remove
all side-channels from QKD implementations. Its main draw-
back, however, is that it needs a loophole-free Bell test which
so far has never been performed. Also, the expected secret key
rate at practical distances is unfortunately very limited with
current technology (of the order of 10−10 bits per signal) [36],
[37]. Still, diQKD could be a viable solution for short distance
transmission in the future with improved technology.
In summary, the first solution is very difficult to realise
in practice, the second one is ad hoc and cannot provide
information-theoretic security, and diQKD is unfeasible with
present-day technology. The rest of the paper is dedicated
to analyse the fourth solution, which is called measurement-
device-independent QKD (mdiQKD) [38]. As will be dis-
cussed below, this approach can remove all side-channels
from the measurement unit, which is (as discussed previously)
the weakest part of a QKD realisation. Most importantly,
mdiQKD is fully practical with current technology and it
allows QKD with a high key rate and at a long distance.
Therefore, mdiQKD offers a clear avenue to bridge the gap
between theory and practice in QKD.
II. MEASUREMENT-DEVICE-INDEPENDENT QKD
To understand the working principle of mdiQKD, let us
first introduce an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) based QKD
protocol (see Fig. 2a). Each of Alice and Bob prepares an EPR
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Fig. 2. (Color online) (a) An Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) based QKD
protocol. Step 1: Each of Alice and Bob prepares an EPR pair and sends half
of it to an untrusted third party, Charles. Step 2: On receiving the signals,
Charles is supposed to realise an entanglement swapping operation via a Bell
state measurement (BSM) and then broadcast his measurement results. Step
3: Alice and Bob measure their particles using the X or Z bases, which
they select at random. Step 4: Alice and Bob test the honesty of Charles by
comparing a randomly chosen portion of their data. (b) An equivalent time-
reversed EPR based QKD protocol [39]. Since Charles’ operations commute
with those of Alice and Bob, one can reverse the order of the measurements
(steps 2 and 3 in subfigure (a)). That is, Alice and Bob can safely measure
their signals before Charles actually implements the BSM.
pair and sends half of it to an untrusted third party, Charles.
Charles is supposed to perform an entanglement swapping
operation [40], [41] on the incoming signals via a Bell state
measurement (BSM), and then broadcast his measurement
results. Once this step is completed, Alice and Bob measure
their halves of the EPR pairs by using two conjugate bases
(the rectilinear basis Z, or the diagonal basis X) that they
select at random. Importantly, by doing so they can determine
whether or not Charles is honest. For this, they can compare
a randomly chosen subset of their data to test if it satisfies the
expected correlations associated with the Bell state declared
by Charles.
Interestingly, this protocol can also be implemented in
a “time-reversal” fashion (see Fig. 2b). This is so because
Charles’ operations commute with those of Alice and Bob.
Therefore, one can reverse the order of the measurements. That
is, it is not necessary that Alice and Bob wait for Charles’s
results in order to measure their halves of the EPR pairs, but
they can measure them beforehand. Note that Charles’ BSM
is only used to check the parity of Alice’s and Bob’s bits
and, therefore, it does not reveal any information about the
individual bit values. This rephrases the original EPR based
QKD protocol into an equivalent prepare-and-measure scheme
where Alice and Bob directly send Charles BB84 states and
Charles performs the measurements. Most importantly, like in
the original EPR based QKD protocol, Alice and Bob can test
the honesty of Charles by just comparing a random portion of
their signals.
This time-reversal scenario has been studied in1 [39], [42]
(see also [43] which discussed the BSM conducted by Charles
in QKD). Unfortunately, however, these important works of-
fered very limited performance and, therefore, they had been
largely forgotten by the QKD community. For instance, the
scheme in [39] requires perfect single-photon sources and
long-term quantum memories, which renders it unpractical
with current technology. Inamori’s scheme [42] uses practical
weak coherent pulses (WCPs) but it does not include decoy
states, as it was proposed long before the advent of the
decoy-state method [44], [45], [46]. The main merits of the
mdiQKD proposal introduced in [38] are twofold: first, it
realised the importance of the results in [39], [42] to remove
all detector side-channels from QKD implementations and,
second, it significantly improves the system performance with
practical signals by including decoy states.
An example of a possible mdiQKD implementation is
illustrated in Fig. 3a [38]. The protocol can be summarised in
the following three steps (see the caption of Fig. 3 for further
details):
Step 1: Alice and Bob prepare phase-randomised WCPs
(together with decoy signals) in the BB84 states and send
them to an untrusted relay Charles.
Step 2: If Charles is honest, he performs a BSM that projects
Alice’s and Bob’s signals into a Bell state. In any case, he
announces whether or not his measurements are successful,
including the Bell states obtained.
Step 3: Post-processing: Alice and Bob keep the data
corresponding to Charles’ successful measurement results and
discard the rest. Also, they post-select the events where they
employ the same basis and, based on the outcomes announced
by Charles, say Alice flips part of her bits to correctly correlate
them with those of Bob. Finally, they use the decoy-state
method to estimate the gain and QBER of the single-photon
1Note that this approach also resembles that proposed in [6], where
Bob teleports any incoming signal from outside to himself by setting up a
teleportation gateway inside his own secured laboratory. In so doing, it is
possible to remove all side-channels from his measurement unit. However,
note that the authors of [6] considered that the BSM that is required for
teleportation could be trusted.
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Fig. 3. (Color online) (a) Schematic diagram of a possible measurement-
device-independent QKD (mdiQKD) implementation [38]. Alice and Bob pre-
pare BB84 polarisation states and send them to an untrusted relay Charles/Eve,
which can be treated as a “black box”. The relay is supposed to perform a
Bell state measurement (BSM) that projects Alice’s and Bob’s signals into a
Bell state. In contrast to diQKD, note that now there is no need to protect
Charles’ black box from any unwanted information leakage. (b) Example of
a decoy-state BB84 transmitter. The WCPs are generated using four emitting
laser diodes. These signals are then phase-randomised with a phase modulator
(PM). Decoy states are prepared using an amplitude modulator (AM). In the
figure: (M) mirror, (BS) beam-splitter, (QRNG) quantum random number
generator, (F) optical filter and (I) optical isolator. (c) Example of a BSM
implementation with linear optics. Charles interferes the incoming pulses at a
50:50 BS, which has on each end a polarising beam-splitter (PBS) that projects
the photons into either horizontal (H) or vertical (V ) polarisation states. A
“click” in the single-photon detectors D1H and D2V, or in D1V and D2H,
indicates a projection into the singlet state |ψ−〉 = (|HV 〉 − |V H〉)/√2,
while a “click” in D1H and D1V, or in D2H and D2V, implies a projection
into the triplet state |ψ+〉 = (|HV 〉+ |V H〉)/√2. Other detection patterns
are considered unsuccessful.
contributions2.
Note that opposed to diQKD, now there is no need to
protect Charles’ measurement unit from unwanted leakage of
information to the outside (see Table I). Indeed, this device
can be fully controlled or even manufactured by Eve. This is
significant because it means that there is no need to certify
2The idea of the decoy state protocol is that each of Alice and Bob uses
an intensity modulator to modulate the intensity of each photon pulse. For
instance, in a two decoy state protocol, the intensity of each pulse is chosen
randomly from a set of prescribed intensities (with average photon numbers
µ, ν and ω), where µ (e.g. about 0.5) is the signal state, ν (about 0.1) is
the first decoy state and ω (about 0.005 or even 0) is the second decoy
state. The key insight of decoy state is that, given a pulse of n photons
sent by Alice/Bob, Eve cannot differentiate it from the case where it has
originated from a signal state or a decoy state. In other words, the gain and
QBER depend only on the actual photon number n, but are independent of
whether it has originated from a signal or a decoy. After the transmission and
Charles’ broadcast of his measurement outcomes, Alice and Bob announce
which pulses are signals and which pulses are decoys (i.e., the intensity, µ,
ν or ω used). Therefore, they can subsequently compute the gain and the
QBER for all the combinations of signals and decoys. Based on such data,
using the method described in Section IV-A, Alice and Bob can then estimate
a lower bound to the single-photon contributions (together with their error
rate) to Charles’ successful BSM outcomes. From there, they can obtain a
lower bound on the key generation rate.
the detectors in a QKD standardisation process3. A small
drawback of mdiQKD is that Alice and Bob need to know
which states they send to Charles4. However, as we have seen
in Sec. I-B, it is reasonable to expect that they can indeed
characterise their sources and protect their state preparation
processes from Eve’s influence. Also, as will be discussed
below in Sec. IV-C, recent results show that a full source
characterisation is not absolutely necessary for mdiQKD to
work [27], [48], [49].
In the asymptotic scenario where Alice and Bob send
Charles an infinite number of signals, the secret key rate has
the form [38]
R ≥ QZ11[1−H2(eX11)]−QZµµfe(EZµµ)H2(EZµµ), (1)
where QZ11 is the gain (i.e., the probability that Charles
declares a successful result) when Alice and Bob send him
one single-photon each in the Z basis; eX11 is the phase error
rate of these single-photon signals; QZµµ and E
Z
µµ represent,
respectively, the gain and the quantum bit error rate (QBER)
in the Z basis when Alice and Bob send Charles WCPs of
intensity µ; fe ≥ 1 is the error correction inefficiency function,
and H2(x)=−x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary
entropy function.
Eq. (1) assumes that Alice and Bob use the Z basis for key
generation and the X basis for testing only [50]. The term
QZ11H2(e
X
11) corresponds to the information removed from the
final key in the privacy amplification step of the protocol, while
QZµµfe(E
Z
µµ)H2(E
Z
µµ) is the information revealed by Alice in
the error correction step. The quantities QZµµ and E
Z
µµ are
directly measured in the experiment, while QZ11 and e
X
11 can
be estimated using the decoy-state method [38].
III. EXPERIMENTAL DEMONSTRATIONS
Up to date, four successful independent mdiQKD experi-
mental realisations have already been reported [51], [52], [53],
[54]. Table II includes a brief summary of their main features.
In the POP (proof-of-principle) demonstrations [51], [52], both
Alice and Bob send the same quantum state repeatedly without
random selection of the encoding states or bases. Therefore,
no secret key is actually distributed between Alice and Bob.
In [53], [54], however, two real demonstrations with key
exchange have been performed. Below, we review in more
detail these results.
The main experimental challenge of mdiQKD is to perform
a high-fidelity BSM between photons from different light
sources, which is not required in conventional QKD schemes.
Indeed, to obtain high-visibility two-photon interference (and,
3The idea of using an untrusted relay (e.g. a BSM by Charles) in QKD
has been discussed in not only [39], [42], but also in diQKD proposals such
as [43], [36], [37]. However, all these approaches have limited performance in
terms of key rate and distance with current technologies. Compared to these
solutions, the key advantage of mdiQKD is its strong performance in key rate
and distance with only present-day technologies.
4The idea of using a trusted source (in combination with an untrusted
measurement unit) in QKD has previously been discussed in, for example,
the prepare-and-measure version of one-sided diQKD [47]. Nonetheless, one-
sided diQKD requires a high detection efficiency and its performance is also
limited. Comparatively speaking, mdiQKD does not require a high detection
efficiency and it can achieve a much higher key rate and distance with current
technologies.
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TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN MDIQKD DEMONSTRATIONS
Ref. [51] Ref. [52] Ref. [53] Ref. [54]
Encoding Time-bin Polarisation Time-bin Polarisation
Implementation POP∗ POP Real∗∗ Real
Condition Field test Lab Lab Lab
Fiber length 28.8 km 17 km 50 km 10 km
Asymp-key rate† ∼ 10−6 ∼ 10−6 N.A. ∼ 10−6
Finite-key rate‡ N.A.∗∗∗ N.A. ∼ 10−7 ∼ 10−8
Repetition rate 2 MHz 1 MHz 1 MHz 0.5 MHz
*POP represents “proof-of-principle” experiment, i.e., no key exchange.
**Real: there is true key exchange.
***N.A. represents “not available”
†The key rate (bits/pulse) under the assumption of infinite long keys.
‡The key rate (bits/pulse) after finite-key corrections.
therefore, to have a low QBER), Alice’s photons should be
indistinguishable from those of Bob5. Furthermore, if one
implements mdiQKD over telecom fibres, it is necessary to
include feedback controls to compensate the time-dependent
polarisation rotations and propagation delays caused by the fi-
bres. Note that in standard QKD systems, this requirement can
be relaxed by using phase encoding [55], [56], because the two
optical pulses, which interfere with each other at the receiver’s
end, pass through the same optical fibre and thus experience
the same polarisation rotation and phase change. Therefore,
one can achieve high interference visibility without performing
any polarisation control. Nevertheless, this advantage of phase
encoding (in comparison to other encoding schemes) cannot
be directly translated to mdiQKD. The reason is that now
Alice’s and Bob’s signals are generated from two independent
lasers and they propagate through two independent quantum
channels. Consequently, in mdiQKD, polarisation management
is required in all encoding schemes.
The feasibility of generating indistinguishable photons from
two independent lasers was already investigated in the original
mdiQKD proposal [38], where the authors conducted a Hong-
Ou-Mandel (HOM) experiment using two independent com-
mercial off-the-shelf lasers. By carefully matching the central
frequencies, the pulse shapes, the arrival times, and the polar-
isation states of the photons, an HOM interference visibility
close to the theoretical value of 50% was observed at different
average photon numbers (from 0.2 to 4). The near perfect
HOM visibility implied that the photons generated by the
two lasers were almost identical. The same method was also
adopted in more recent studies to verify the indistinguishability
of photons from different sources [51], [52], [53], [54].
So far, both time-bin [51], [53] and polarisation encod-
ing [52], [54] mdiQKD have been demonstrated. In the first
POP mdiQKD demonstration [51], an HOM interference ex-
periment was conducted with photons generated by indepen-
dent sources that travel through separate field-deployed fibres
of lengths 6.2 km and 12.4 km, respectively. By performing
automatic polarisation stabilisation, manual adjustment of the
5In principle, one may suggest that first Charles sends strong light pulses
(from the same laser) to both Alice and Bob, who then encode their bit values,
attenuate the pulses, and send them back to Charles. However, note that this
design could compromise the security of the whole system, as now Charles
could try to interfere with Alice’s and Bob’s state preparation processes.
photons arrival time, and manual adjustment of the lasers
frequency, a high interference visibility was obtained even
under a real-world environment. The two light pulses con-
structing a time-bin signal were generated by modulating the
output of a CW laser twice. When compared to other recent
experimental implementations of mdiQKD [52], [53], [54], the
scheme in [51] required higher laser frequency stability. This
is so because the phase difference between Alice’s and Bob’s
lasers must be constant within a time window corresponding
to two time-bin pulses rather than to only a single laser pulse.
A similar time-bin encoding mdiQKD scheme was in-
vestigated in [53] (see Fig. 4). The authors performed a
real mdiQKD demonstration with random selection of encod-
ing states and bases. They made use of custom-made and
specialised devices including high-efficiency up-conversion
single-photon detectors. Here, the time-bin signals were gen-
erated by sending a laser pulse through an unbalanced fibre
interferometer. Compared to [51], this approach relaxes the
requirement on the frequency stability of two lasers but it
needs phase stabilisation of the fibre interferometers.
Polarisation encoding mdiQKD was also performed by two
independent research groups. In particular, [52] demonstrated
that the polarisation rotation due to a long fibre could be
compensated using conventional polarisation feedback con-
trol. [52] is a POP experiment and no key was actually
exchanged. In [54], the authors performed a real mdiQKD
demonstration over 10 km of single-mode fibre using solely
commercial off-the-shelf devices. This implementation setup is
shown in Fig. 5. The two lasers used in this experiment are two
commercial frequency-stabilized lasers where the frequency
of each laser is individually locked to a local gas cell that
is integrated by the manufacturer. Thus, there is no optical
or electronic link between the two lasers. Here, a finite-key
security analysis [57] was applied to optimise the experimental
parameters and to evaluate the final secure key rate. This rate
is slightly lower than that in [53] due to the limited detection
efficiency and repetition rate of the system.
All these experiments, when taken together, complete the
cycle needed to demonstrate the feasibility of using off-the-
shelf optoelectronic devices to build a QKD system that is
immune to all detector side-channel attacks.
IV. THEORETICAL ASPECTS FOR MDIQKD
As we have seen in Sec. II, since practical and efficient
single-photon sources are still unavailable, the original theoret-
ical proposal of mdiQKD [38], together with the experimental
realisations presented in the previous section, considers WCPs
and decoy states instead. However, in order to apply the results
of [38] to real-life systems, there are still some loose ends that
need to be addressed. In particular, [38] assumes that Alice
and Bob use an infinite number of decoy-state settings. Also,
for simplicity, this study neglects statistical fluctuations due
to the finite data size. In this section, we review the latest
developments in mdiQKD to overcome these limitations.
A. Decoy-state protocol with a finite number of settings
The analysis of this scenario is basically the same as that of
conventional decoy-state QKD systems [44], [45], [46]. The
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Fig. 4. (Color online) Demonstration of mdiQKD using time-bin encoding realised in China [53]. (a) Alice (Bob) passes her (his) laser pulses through an
unbalanced Mach-Zehnder (MZ) interferometer to generate two time-bin pulses. Three amplitude modulators (AMs) and a phase modulator (PM) are used to
generate decoy states and encode the time-bin qubit. The pulses are then attenuated by an attenuator (ATT) and pass through 25 km fibre spools of each arm
to the measurement unit. The pulses finally interfere at a 50:50 fibre beam-splitter (BS) to perform a BSM. The two outputs are detected by up-conversion
detectors. (Part b) Schematic diagram of the up-conversion single-photon detector. In the figure: (PC) polarisation controller, (DM) dichroic mirror, (BP) band
pass filter, and (SP) short pass filter. (Part c) Schematic diagram of the phase stabilisation setup. (Cir) circulator, (PS) phase shifter, and (PBS) polarising
beam-splitter. (Reprinted Figure with permission from [53]).
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Fig. 5. (Color online) Demonstration of mdiQKD using polarisation encoding realised in Toronto, Canada [54]. Each of the two CW frequency-locked lasers
is attenuated by an optical attenuator (Attn) and modulated by an intensity modulator (IM), which is driven by an electrical pulse generator (PG), to prepare
weak coherent pulses (WCPs). The phases of these pulses are uniformly modulated by a phase modulator (PM) for active phase randomisation. Next, an
acousto-optic modulator (AOM) randomly modulates their intensities to implement the decoy-state protocol. Key bits are encoded into polarisation states of the
WCPs using a polarisation modulator (Pol-M). Alice and Bob send their signals to Charles through a 5 km fibre spool. On receiving the transmission, Charles
performs a BSM on the incoming pulses using a beam-splitter (BS) and a polarising beam-splitter (PBS) together with two commercial SPDs. Synchronisation
is done with the help of an electrical delay generator (DG). In the figure: (PC) polarisation controller, (RNG) random number generator and (TIA) time
interval analyser. (Figure reproduced from [54]).
sole difference is that now both Alice and Bob send decoy
signals to a common receiver (instead of only Alice sending
decoy states to Bob), which makes the mathematics slightly
more cumbersome. Fortunately, it has been shown that also in
this situation it is enough if Alice and Bob employ just two
decoy settings each. That is, this configuration can already
provide them with a quite tight estimation of the relevant
parameters that are needed to prove security (i.e., QZ11 and
eX11 in Eq. (1)).
For instance, the authors of [58] proposed a numerical
method (based on linear programming) for the case where
Alice and Bob employ two (or three) decoy states each. Simi-
larly, Refs. [59], [60] presented different analytical estimation
approaches, based on Gaussian elimination, under the assump-
tion that Alice and Bob can prepare a vacuum state. Also,
following similar analytical lines, the authors of [61], [57]
studied the situation where none of the two decoy signals are
vacuum, because a vacuum state is relatively hard to realise in
practice due to the finite extinction ratio of a practical intensity
modulator [56]. More recently, [62] compared different decoy-
state methods for mdiQKD and confirmed that two decoy
settings are enough to obtain a near optimal estimation of the
relevant parameters. That is, the use of three or more decoy
intensities does not result in any significant improvement of
the final secret key rate in neither the asymptotic nor the finite
data size regimes. All these results provide experimentalists a
clear path to implement mdiQKD with WCPs and decoy states.
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B. Finite-key security analysis
The second question that needs to be solved is related
with the fact that any QKD realisation only produces a finite
amount of data. Of course, a real-life QKD experiment is
always completed in finite time, which means that the length
of the output secret key is obviously finite. Thus, the parameter
estimation procedure in QKD needs to take the statistical
fluctuations of the different parameters into account. This
problem has attracted a lot of research attention in recent
years, and several security proofs in the finite-key regime for
conventional QKD systems have been obtained [63], [64] (see
also [65] for a review on this topic). Very recently, it was
possible to obtain tight finite-key security bounds for both
the BB84 protocol with single-photons [66] and the decoy-
state BB84 scheme [67], [68]. These security bounds are valid
against the most general attacks.
Similar techniques can also be applied to mdiQKD. For
example, the authors of [58] made a first step in this direction
and provided a finite-key security analysis that assumes a
Gaussian distribution for the statistical fluctuations. Also, [69]
includes an analogous study that is valid against particular
types of attacks. More recently, [57] presented a finite-key
security proof that is valid against general attacks and it
does not assume any particular distribution for the statistical
fluctuations. In addition, this result satisfies the “composable”
definition of the security of QKD [70], [71]. That is, the
generated secret keys remain secure when they are employed
as a resource for other cryptographic systems (e.g., the one-
time-pad protocol). All these results confirm the feasibility of
long-distance implementations of mdiQKD (for instance, say
100 km of optical fibre with 0.2 dB/km loss) with current
technology and within a reasonable time-frame of signal
transmission. As an illustration, Fig. 6 shows the simulation
result presented in [57].
C. Further theoretical developments
1) Encoding schemes: The original theoretical proposal of
mdiQKD [38] uses polarisation encoding. However, mdiQKD
can be realised as well, as we have seen in Section III, using
other encoding schemes like phase encoding [72], [73] or time-
bin encoding [74]. Polarisation encoding is typically more
suitable for free-space implementations due to the negligible
birefringence of air, while phase encoding and time-bin encod-
ing are usually more convenient for fibre-based realisations. In
order to select the optimal experimental parameters for these
implementations, detailed theoretical system models have been
developed in [61] (for polarisation encoding), in [73] (for
phase encoding), and in [74] (for time-bin encoding). Also,
a parameter optimisation method has been presented in [62].
Of course, the channels that connect Alice and Bob with
Charles are typically of different length and have different
transmittances. Indeed, such asymmetric case is expected in
most mdiQKD realisations [51]; it has been studied in [61].
2) Extending the covered distance and achievable secret key
rate: One possible solution to achieve these goals is, of course,
to use ultra-low loss fibres [75] in combination with high
detection efficiency SPDs [76]. For instance, Fig. 7 shows the
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Fig. 6. (Color online) Secret key rate in logarithmic scale for mdiQKD
as a function of the distance between Alice and Bob [57]. The solid lines
correspond to different values for the total number of signals N sent by Alice
and Bob. The security bound is  = 10−10. For simulation purposes, the
following experimental parameters are considered: the overall misalignment
in the channel is 1.5%, the loss coefficient of the channel is 0.2 dB/km, the
detection efficiency of the relay is 14.5%, and the background count rate is
6.02× 10−6. These results demonstrate that even with a realistic finite size
of data, say N = 1012 to 1014, it is possible to achieve secure mdiQKD
at long distances. In comparison, the dotted line represents a lower bound
on the secret key rate for the asymptotic case where Alice and Bob send
Charles infinite signals and use an infinite number of decoy settings. (Figure
reproduced from [57]).
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Fig. 7. (Color online) Asymptotic secret key rate in logarithmic scale
for decoy-state BB84 and mdiQKD as a function of the distance between
Alice and Bob. The detection efficiency of the SPDs is 93% [76] and other
experimental parameters coincide with those of Fig. 6.
asymptotic secret key rate versus distance for both the decoy-
state BB84 and mdiQKD, when the detection efficiency of the
SPDs is 93% [76]. Other experimental parameters coincide
with those of Fig. 6.
Alternatively, one could also include quantum memories in
Charles’s measurement device. This last situation has been
analysed in [77], [78] (see Fig. 8). The main idea is quite
simple. Instead of performing a BSM between each pair of
signals received from Alice and Bob, Charles firstly stores
the incoming photons in two heralded quantum memories,
one for Alice’s signals and one for Bob’s signals. After that,
he performs a BSM only between those photons that have
been successfully stored in the memories. By doing so, he
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Fig. 8. (Color online) Schematic diagram of mdiQKD with heralded quantum
memories [77], [78]. Charles first stores the incoming photons in two heralded
quantum memories, one for Alice and one for Bob. Then, he performs a Bell
state measurement only between those photons that have been successfully
stored in the memories. This significantly increases the success probability of
his measurement unit and, therefore, also the covered distance and achievable
secret key rate are increased. In the figure: (QM) quantum memory, and (BSM)
Bell state measurement.
can increase the success probability of the measurement unit,
which results in a significant increase of both the covered
distance and the secret key rate. Unfortunately, however, this
type of approach is very challenging with current technology.
A more feasible solution nowadays is to place an entangle-
ment source between two quantum relays. This scenario has
been studied in [79]. Its main drawback, however, is its limited
key rate. This is so because of the low detection efficiency of
today’s SPDs [12] together with the fact that now one requires
that two different BSMs are successful at the same time.
3) State preparation flaws: Recently, there have been also
efforts to prove the security of BB84 and mdiQKD when
Alice’s and Bob’s devices are flawed [27], [28], or when their
apparatuses are not fully characterised [48], [49]. Remarkably,
the authors of [27], [28] showed that state preparation flaws
do not significantly affect the performance of BB84 and
mdiQKD. That is, it is not necessary that Alice’s and Bob’s
state preparation process is very precise to obtain a good
performance. Indeed, a modified version of mdiQKD where
Alice and Bob send Charles only three different states can
deliver the same key rate as the original scenario where they
send him four BB84 states [27].
4) Alternative system implementations: The idea of
mdiQKD is compatible as well with other QKD protocols like
continuous-variable schemes [80], [81], [82] or the Scarani-
Acin-Ribordy-Gisin scheme [83]. Also, it can be implemented
with different types of sources [84], [85].
V. OUTLOOK
On the experimental side, it would be necessary to improve
the performance of the mdiQKD implementations realised so
far. For instance, current experimental demonstrations consider
short-distance transmission (i.e., below 50 km) and their sys-
tem clock rate is relatively low (below 2 MHz). For practical
applications, it would be desirable to achieve longer distances
(say around 100-200 km) and to use higher system clock rates
(say 100MHz-1GHz)6. Using state-of-the-art SPDs [76], for
example, could also help to substantially increase the final
key generation rate.
It would be interesting as well to prove the feasibility
of mdiQKD for free-space communications. Such implemen-
tation would constitute a first step towards future satellite-
based mdiQKD networks, in which an untrusted satellite
can be shared by many users. Moreover, continuous-variable
mdiQKD demonstrations using standard telecom devices are
still missing. Furthermore, in the long term, mdiQKD could
be used to build a fibre-based QKD network with untrusted
nodes, in which the users possess low cost, compact devices
to transmit quantum states, while all the expensive calibration
and measurement apparatuses are located within the network
servers7. This scenario, illustrated in Fig. 9, is advantageous
over the recent demonstrations on QKD networks [88], [89],
as it completely removes the trust on the central relay node.
Much work needs to be done as well on the theoretical
side. For instance, as already discussed, a key assumption in
mdiQKD is that Alice’s and Bob’s sources can be trusted.
It would be therefore necessary to further investigate how
this essential requirement could be guaranteed in practice.
Also, it would be important to take both source flaws and
detector flaws into account by combining mdiQKD with the
recent security analysis reported in [27]. Such result, and
its experimental demonstration, would bring QKD a big step
closer to achieving unconditional security. In addition, it would
be beneficial to derive tighter finite-key security bounds such
that the post-processing data block sizes needed to achieve
good performance could be reduced.
Moreover, the idea of mdiQKD can be applied as well to
solve other quantum information tasks, such as the evaluation
of entanglement witness [90], [91], randomness certifica-
tion [92], or to develop diQKD systems that are robust against
channel losses [93].
In summary, mdiQKD enables new scientific developments
in the field of quantum optics, as well as advanced novel
applications for quantum information and quantum commu-
nication. In a popular book “The Code Book” [94] by Simon
Singh, the author suggested that QKD will be the end point
of evolution of cryptography. In this paper, we have shown
that while quantum hacking has threatened the security of
QKD, mdiQKD has now appeared to be an important counter-
measure against it, thus constituting a major step towards
the Holy Grail of cryptography—unconditional security in
communication.
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